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Abstract
This paper presents the main ﬁndings of a survey conducted on a sample of
Portuguese ﬁrms. The main aim was to identify some relevant characteristics
about the dynamics of prices and wages in Portugal. The most important
conclusions are: i) changes to wages are more synchronized than changes to
prices; ii) most wages are deﬁned using inﬂation as a yardstick, even though
there are no formal rules; iii) the wages of most workers are deﬁned in terms of
sector-related collective agreements; iv) a considerable proportion of workers
receive wages above those been agreed under the collective agreement; v)
ﬁrms make frequent use of other mechanisms to cut payroll costs as a way of
overcoming the restrictions imposed by downward nominal wage rigidity.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: D21, E30, J31.
Key Words: survey data, wage rigidity, price rigidity, indexation, institutions.5
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Non technical summary
An appropriate deﬁnition of economic policies in general and monetary policy
in particular requires a deeper understanding of the characteristics and determining
factors underlying wage dynamics. For a member of a monetary union like Por-
tugal, where the exchange rate instrument is no longer available to bring about
adjustments, wage ﬂexibility becomes a fundamental requirement for ensuring an
adequate adjustment to economic shocks.
This has been a topic of intense debate in Portugal where, following a large GDP
contraction in 2009, the unemployment rate has reached the two-digit psychological
threshold for the ﬁrst time. From the point of view of the euro area as a whole,
even though a number of reforms in labour markets have been put into place in
various countries, there are striking diﬀerences remaining in collective bargaining
procedures and other labour market institutions. In addition, wages are also an
important determinant of ﬁrms’ prices. Recent microeconomic research suggests
that those sectors with a higher labour cost share, such as services, typically show
greater price rigidity. In particular, empirical evidence based on microeconomic
data shows that sectors with higher labour cost share are those where changes to
prices are less frequent. Other measurements of price rigidity based on qualitative
information and also presented in this paper are consistent with these ﬁndings.
All this evidence suggests that a deeper knowledge of wage dynamics is crucial for
a better understanding of how prices are determined and, in a more general way, how
the monetary policy transmission mechanism works. There are other factors that
justify the increasing interest in research in this area. They include the importance
of the labour markets in explaining the cyclical behaviour of the economy and the
persistence of structural rigidity factors in labour markets. Empirical research is
fundamental for the deﬁnition of stylised facts on wage dynamics, while theoretical
research is important to adequately incorporate the behaviour of labour markets in
stochastic models of general equilibrium. Based on the information from a survey
conducted in 2008, this paper presents a number of stylised facts on price and wage
dynamics in Portugal. These facts are summed up below:
1. A small fraction of the ﬁrms surveyed state that, in the absence of legal or
contractual constraints, would consider the possibility of reducing their base
wages in 2006 or increase them below the inﬂation rate;
2. Apart from legal and contractual constraints, the impact on workers’ morale
or performance and the risk that the best workers leave the ﬁrm are other
important obstacles to wage cuts or freezes;6
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3. Firms frequently make use of alternative mechanisms to reduce labour costs,
rather than changes to base wages, with cuts in the number of workers being
the most frequent form of adjustment;
4. In many ﬁrms the wage scale agreed in the context of collective wage agree-
ments is taken cases merely as a reference, with a considerable percentage of
workers receiving wages above the amount agreed in collective wage agree-
ments;
5. Most wages are deﬁned with the behaviour of inﬂation borne in mind, above
all expected inﬂation, though without any formal rule;
6. Changes in wages occur less frequently than changes in prices. If frequencies
are converted into durations, it can be seen that the average duration of wages
is slightly higher than one year - about 2 months less than in the euro area
and 2.0 months longer than the average duration of prices;
7. Sectoral variability of wage durations is signiﬁcantly lower than that of prices.
This is also found in most European countries;
8. Changes to wages are more closely synchronised than changes to prices. 81 per
cent of ﬁrms concentrate their wage changes in speciﬁc months of the year (37
per cent in the case of prices), with a very signiﬁcant fraction making these
changes in January.
Recent empirical evidence has thrown down a major challenge to researchers.
New facts have come to light as a result of analysing large-scale microeconomic
databases, either quantitative ones or those based on surveys of ﬁrms. This should
act as a spur for the scientiﬁc community to develop theories that incorporate this
new evidence in models of general equilibrium.7
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1 Introduction
An appropriate deﬁnition of economic policies in general and monetary policy in
particular requires a deeper understanding of the characteristics and determining
factors underlying wage dynamics. For a member of a monetary union like Por-
tugal, where the exchange rate instrument is no longer available to bring about
adjustments, wage ﬂexibility becomes a fundamental requirement for ensuring an
adequate adjustment to shocks, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical. This has
been a topic of intense debate in Portugal where, following a large GDP contraction
in 2009, the unemployment rate has reached the two-digit psychological threshold
for the ﬁrst time in many years. From the point of view of the euro area (EA) as a
whole, even though a number of reforms in labour markets have been put into place
in various countries, there are striking diﬀerences remaining in collective bargain-
ing procedures and other labour market institutions (see, for instance, Caju et al.
(2008)). Besides this, wages are also an important determinant of ﬁrms’ prices. Re-
cent microeconomic research, both qualitative and quantitative, suggests that those
sectors with a higher labour cost share, such as services, typically show a greater
rigidity in prices (see, for instance, Altissimo et al. (2006) and Fabiani et al. (2006,
2007)).
It is within this context that this paper details the ﬁndings of a survey carried out
by the Banco de Portugal in the ﬁrst half of 2008 within the scope of its participation
in the WDN. The main aim of the paper is to identify some relevant characteristics
about the dynamics of prices and wages in Portugal. One natural criticism that can
be pointed out is that it addresses too many issues at the same time and none of them
is analysed in depth. In this context, I believe that those seeking for a theoretical
model and exhaustive econometric estimations may feel a bit disappointed. However,
this is far from being the target of the paper. Besides the innovative features of the
dataset used, the main strength of the paper is precisely the richness of the facts
reported. Many of them are consistent with previous ﬁndings about wage and price
setting in Portugal while others are completely new. Of course, a diﬀerent and
equally interesting approach could have been followed by narrowing the scope of
analysis and focusing on some speciﬁc issues addressed in the survey. This is the
approach followed by Dias, Marques and Martins (2011) and Dias, Marques, Martins
and Silva (2010) who on the basis of a similar qualitative database analyse some
speciﬁc features of ﬁrms’ pricing behaviour in Portugal.
One of the main advantages of using surveys is their ﬂexibility. There is the
possibility of questioning ﬁrms directly on a number of points relating to the way
they set prices or wages, such as the main obstacles to freezing or cutting wages,8
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the most important factors determining wages or the ways they react to signiﬁcant
changes either in demand or in production costs. This type of information, for in-
stance, cannot be obtained from large administrative databases such as the Ministry
for Labour and Social Solidarity Personnel Database (Quadros de Pessoal -Q P )o r
the Social Security Wage Database (Base de Dados do Registo de Remunera¸ c˜ oes da
Seguran¸ ca Social - BDRR)1. Moreover, surveys that are not conducted directly with
the ﬁrms may well throw up a number of problems. These relate both to the low
response rate normally obtained and to the possibility of ill-judged interpretation
of the questions raised. Apart from this, the responses may be coloured by other
factors, such as the way questions are formulated or the economic outlook in which
they occur.
The remaining of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 details
the process of sample selection, the questionnaire and the way the survey was con-
ducted. Section 3 describes some of the institutional characteristics of the labour
market that is being reviewed. The analysis is based on information from the survey,
and includes such things as the importance of collective contracts or the relative size
of the so-called wage cushion, i.e. the diﬀerence between eﬀective and contracted
wages in Portugal. There is also a short comparison between the architecture of
the wage bargaining process in Portugal and the rest of Europe. Section 4 presents
some stylised facts about the dynamics of prices and wages in Portugal, as well as
the link between the two. Section 5 looks at the evidence on wage rigidity (real and
nominal) and describes some of adjustment strategies used by ﬁrms as an alterna-
tive to changes in base wages. Section 6 looks at the reaction of ﬁrms to diﬀerent




The survey was carried out by the Banco de Portugal between September 2007
and June 2008 on a sample covering manufacturing, energy, construction, retail and
1The Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity Personnel Database are collected annually by
the Strategy and Planning Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity from all
Portuguese ﬁrms. The data is therefore tantamount to a census and is an extremely important
source of information for a microeconomic analysis of the labour market in Portugal, making it
possible to undertake longitudinal analysis of ﬁrms and employees. Another very useful source
is the Social Security Wage Database. The information is collected on a monthly basis and is
permanently updated. It provides important data for an assessment of short-term movements in
the labour market.9
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wholesale trade, transport and communications, education, health, ﬁnancial services
and other business services. All told, there were 46 two-digit NACE sectors. There
were 4,850 ﬁrms contacted to participate2. Compared with the survey conducted
in 2006 in the context of the Banco de Portugal participation in the Inﬂation Per-
sistence Network (see Martins (2010)), twice the number of ﬁrms were contacted
and the number of sectors covered was increased signiﬁcantly, particularly through
the inclusion of trade, construction and ﬁnancial services. The ﬁrms were chosen
from those on the Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity Personnel Database
(Quadros de Pessoal, QP). Given the prevalence of very small ﬁrms in the Por-
tuguese production structure, a pure random selection of ﬁrms would clearly have
led to over-representation of smaller-scale ﬁrms. To solve this, the survey targeted
only ﬁrms with ten or more workers. Data collection was split into two stages. For
the ﬁrst, it was decided to include all ﬁrms with 100 or more workers in the sectors
mentioned above. This provided 2,756 ﬁrms. The remaining 2,244 were chosen on
the basis of random stratiﬁcation. The total number of ﬁrms was divided into three
groups according to the number of their workers: i) ﬁrms with 10 or more workers
but less than 20; ii) ﬁrms with 20 or more workers but less than 50; and iii) ﬁrms
with 50 or more workers but less than 100. Grouping these in the two-digit sec-
tors chosen led to 138 mutually exclusive strata. The number of ﬁrms to be drawn
from each stratum was set on the basis of the relative frequency obtained in the QP
for 2005. Once this ﬁgure was reached, the ﬁrms within each stratum were chosen
randomly. The ﬁnal sample included 1,872 ﬁrms from manufacturing, 25 from the
energy sector, 657 from the construction, 841 from trade, 82 from ﬁnancial services
and 1,373 from other business services, such as education, health, transport and
communications. These ﬁrms represented around 35 per cent of total employment
in Portugal. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix show further details on the sample
coverage.
2.2 Structure and methodology for carrying out the survey
The questionnaire was developed within the scope of the WDN and was based on
a set of common questions for all 17 national central banks involved. This was
organised in four sections, corresponding to 39 questions (the English version of
the questionnaire sent to the ﬁrms is attached to the paper). The opportunity
provided by the survey was also used to include some additional questions, as a way
2There were 5,000 chosen, but the survey was only sent to 4,850 because it was found ` a posteriori
that some ﬁrms had merged and others had closed. In addition, some ﬁrms that took part in the
pilot survey were not included in the ﬁnal sample, given that the questionnaire they had received
was diﬀerent in some ways from the ﬁnal version.10
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to look into some speciﬁc aspects related to the price and wage setting practices in
Portugal, among them the size and importance of the so-called wage cushion (the
diﬀerence between eﬀective and contracted wages), the relevance of labour legislation
and collective contracts as limiting factors in wage bargaining and questions on price
setting (based on the the 2004 survey experience), such as the speed of price reactions
following signiﬁcant changes in costs or demand. An attempt was made to avoid
technical language in the questions so that as many people could understand them
as possible. After the sample was set up, in September 2007, a ﬁrst version of the
questionnaire was sent to 30 ﬁrms. As in the 2004 survey, the pilot questionnaire
turned out to be very useful for an initial assessment of how the project was received
and whether it was viable. A number of ﬁrms were contacted on the basis of the
ﬁrst replies and some questions were rephrased or cut out, making the questionnaire
shorter and easier to understand. In October, a revised version was sent to all the
ﬁrms chosen, together with a letter signed by the Head of the Research Department.
The letter made it clear, among other things, that the questionnaire should be
answered by someone who was very well aware of the range of procedures underlying
how wages and prices were determined. More than one person could answer it, as
long as there was an overall consistency in the replies. In addition, there was a
number of questions speciﬁcally for the banking sector. This contained a number of
diﬀerences from the base version, especially as regards the concept of price in this
sector. After receiving the questionnaire, the ﬁrms had 15 working days to send
their replies, which could be either paper based or through an Internet site specially
set up for this purpose3. In mid-January 2008, a reminder was sent to all the ﬁrms
that had to that date not replied. All the replies were received by June. There were
1,499 valid questionnaires received, which corresponde to a 32 per cent reply rate.
This percentage was lower than for the 2004 survey (which had been 55 per cent),
but it was higher than original expectations, given that this was a more complex
questionnaire, covering a topic that was especially sensitive for some ﬁrms, as it is
the case of their wage setting practices.
3A help line was set up for ﬁrms to request clariﬁcation. They were able to use telephone, fax
or e-mail.11
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3 Some aspects of the institutional architecture
of wage bargaining in Portugal
The Portuguese Constitution provides the juridical principles of collective bargaining
and grants unions the right to negotiate4. The eﬀects of the agreements are formally
recognized and considered valid sources of labour law.
Concerning the bargaining mechanisms, a distinction should be made between
the conventional regime and the mandatory regime. Conventional bargaining re-
sults from direct negotiation between employers’ and workers’ representatives. A
mandatory regime, on the other hand, does not result from direct bargaining be-
tween workers and employers, being instead dictated by the Ministry of Labour.
The Ministry can extend an existing collective agreement to other workers initially
not covered by it or it can create a new one, if it is not viable to extend the ap-
plication of an existing document. A mandatory regime is applied when workers
are not covered by unions, when one of the parties involved refuses to negotiate or
bargaining is obstructed in any other way5. Therefore, the impact of collective bar-
gaining goes far beyond union membership and the distinction between unionized
and non-unionized workers or ﬁrms becomes unimportant.
Collective negotiations are usually conducted at the industry or occupation level.
The law does not establish mechanisms of coordination between agreements reached
in diﬀerent negotiations. However, preference is given to vertical over horizontal
agreements, and the principle of the most favourable condition to the worker gen-
erally applies.
Since most collective agreements are industry-wide, covering companies with very
diﬀerent sizes and economic conditions, their contents tend to be general, setting
minimum working conditions, in particular the base monthly wage for each category
of workers, overtime pay and the normal duration of work. Underlying the bargain-
ing process there is a mandatory minimum monthly wage which sets the minimum
ﬂoor for wage negotiations6.
4Portugal (2006) and Marques et al. (2010) provide a detailed description of the Portuguese
wage bargaining system.
5Beyond the existence of compulsive extension mechanisms, voluntary extensions are also pos-
sible, when one economic partner (workers’ representative or employer) decides to subscribe to an
agreement which it had initially not signed.
6Currently, there is a unique legal minimum wage that applies to all workers. Workers formally
classiﬁed as apprentices receive just 80 percent of the full rate. The minimum wage is updated
annually by the parliament, under government proposal. Decisions on the level of the minimum
wage are taken on a discretionary basis, usually taking into account past and predicted inﬂation
and after consulting the social partners. For 2011, the minimum monthly wage was set at 480
euros12
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The Portuguese system of industrial relations apparently presents features of a
centralized wage bargaining system7. Massive collective agreements, often covering
a whole industry, predominate in the economy, while ﬁrm-level collective bargaining
covers a low proportion of the workforce. Moreover, trade union confederations, em-
ployers’ federations and the Government meet at the national level each year to set
a guideline for wage increases (the so-called social concertation). Yet, this guideline
is not mandatory and merely guides the collective bargaining that follows. However,
the fragmented nature of the trade union structure, the fragmented employers’ asso-
ciations and the multiplicity of bargaining units provides the system with a certain
degree of decentralization. Even though collective bargaining in Portugal takes place
at a sectoral level and most workers are covered by the bargaining system due to
the existence of mandatory extensions, the coordination between bargaining units
is rather limited. In fact, the right to negotiate is given upon every employer or
employers’ association and to every trade union (regardless of the number of aﬃli-
ated members they represent), and the parties have the possibility of choosing the
level of negotiation - regional, occupational, industrial or national. This leads to
the existence of a diﬀuse and complex system of wage bargaining with negotiation
fragmented and agreements multiplied.
The institutional framework of wage bargaining is usually seen as playing an
important role in determining the dynamics of wages and, in general, of the labour
market itself. Druant et al. (2009) show that labour market institutions inﬂuence
the frequency and timing of wage changes, while Babecky et al. (2009a)a n dD i c k e n s
et al. (2007) show that the institutional framework is also an important determinant
of downward wage rigidity. In addition, institutions seem to inﬂuence the reaction of
ﬁrms to shocks, as suggested by Bertola et al. (2010), as well as the degree to which
ﬁrms use available adjustment policies to reduce labour costs. This is documented
in Babecky et al. (2009b). There is in fact a vast body of literature that looks at
the impact of the institutional frameworks where decisions are taken on wages as
a result of the wage bargaining process (including decisions on wage levels, wage
dispersion and rigidity)8.
7Caju et al. (2008) perform a cluster analysis and identify three groups of countries using in-
formation collected following a questionnaire to national central banks. The ﬁrst group (Austria,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) mainly
consists of countries with a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining. This group is character-
ized by the existence of extension procedures and a high level of collective agreement coverage, a
dominance of sectoral wage bargaining and the general absence of coordination. The second group
(Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain) exhibits the same general wage set-
ting characteristics as the previous group, but, in addition, some form of indexation, intersectoral
agreements and the role of government are all more important. Finally, the third group (Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Poland, the UK and the US) gathers the countries
where the wage bargaining system is largely deregulated.13
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Despite the importance given to the role of institutional wages, the information
available from international sources is rather scarce9. The survey provides infor-
mation on a range of institutional characteristics that may inﬂuence wage decisions
in Portugal, among them the degree of centralised decision-making, collective con-
tract coverage or the relative importance of contracted wages. The main conclusions
relating to wage institutions in Portugal are summed up below.
The wages of most workers, above all those in larger ﬁrms, are determined in the
context of collective agreements at the sectoral level. In around 60 per cent of ﬁrms
wages are set through agreements of this nature, although in only 30 per cent of the
cases are the ﬁrms directly involved in the negotiations (Figure 1)10. Furthermore,
9.7 per cent of the ﬁrms apply ﬁrm-level wage agreements: in 6.9 per cent ﬁrm-level
and sectoral agreements coexist, whereas in 2.8 per cent ﬁrm-level agreements are
exclusive. As might be expected, collective wage agreements are more important in
larger ﬁrms11. There is little diﬀerence between the sectors analysed.
The share of workers covered by collective agreements (either sectoral or ﬁrm-
level) is signiﬁcant, and it is considerably higher than the estimates for the union
density. This phenomenon is frequently explained by a simple fact: although in legal
terms the agreements are only binding for unionised workers and ﬁrms aﬃliated
to employers associations, the collective agreement is typically extended to all the
workers and ﬁrms in a speciﬁc sector. This can be done on a voluntary basis, or
through extension procedures issued by Ministry for Labour and Social Solidarity.
According to the Employment Outlook of the OECD, in 2004, union density in
Portugal in 2000 stood at 24 per cent (compared with 61 per cent in 1980 and 32 per
cent in 1990). More recent data, from the International Social Survey Programme,
published in the Labour Relations White Book, point to a 17 per cent rate in 2007.
These ﬁgures are considerably lower than the average percentage of workers covered
by collective agreements as found in our survey (Figure 2). The level of coverage is
particularly high in the ﬁnancial services and tends to increase with the size of the
ﬁrms.
8For a summary of the recent literature on the subject, see Freeman (2007).
9The OECD has probably the most comprehensive database in this ﬁeld. It provides quanti-
tative information on an array of developed countries relating to the percentage of cover through
collective contracts, unionisation rates, the importance of minimum wages and the degree of coor-
dination and decentralisation of decisions (see, for example, Elmeskov et al. (1998))
10Unless otherwise stated, all the results shown are weighted in terms of the relative size of each
ﬁrm measured on the basis of the number of workers. Blank replies were excluded.
11In the context of the analysis ﬁrms were split according to their size into the following cate-
gories: i) very small ﬁrms (between 10 and 19 workers); ii) small ﬁrms (between 20 and 49 workers);
iii) medium-sized ﬁrms (between 50 and 199 workers); and iv) large ﬁrms (more than 199 workers).14
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Figure 1: Share of ﬁrms with wages set under sectoral collective wage agreements




















































































































































Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
Figure 2: Share of workers covered by collective wage agreements




















































































































































Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008). 15
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Figure 3: Share of workers with base wages above the wage scale




















































































































































Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
It is worth noting, however, that the wage scale agreed in the context of collective
wage agreements is taken in many cases merely as a reference. Indeed, a signiﬁcant
number of ﬁrms pay wages above those agreed under collective wage agreements
(Figure 3). The share of ﬁrms paying this wage cushion is particularly high in
ﬁnancial services12. Cardoso and Portugal (2005) estimate that the eﬀective wages
in 1999 exceed contracted wages in amount that varies between 20 and 50 per cent.
The ﬁgure obtained in the survey is 25 per cent. From the point of view of the ﬁrms,
the way this cushion is handled makes it a strategic buﬀer against adverse shocks,
in particular in a context where downward nominal wage rigidity turns out to be an
active constraint.
4 The behaviour of prices and wages: duration
and interaction
As mentioned before, one of the most robust facts coming out of recent microeco-
nomic evidence points to the fact that those sectors with higher labour cost shares
tend to show a higher degree of price rigidity (see Altissimo et al. (2006); Fabiani
et al. (2006)). This in turn is frequently suggested as sign of greater wage rigidity.
Non-ﬁnancial services - a sector where the labour cost share is typically high - are
often cited as an example where the degree of price ﬂexibility is strongly aﬀected by
12Financial services include the banking sector and the insurance companies.16
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Figure 4: Frequency of price changes




















































































































































No regular pattern Less than annually Annually From quarterly to half-yearly From daily to monthly
Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
wage rigidity. Dias, Marques, Martins and Silva (2010) show that the cost structure
is an important determinant of how fast ﬁrms react to cost and demand shocks
shocks. In particular, they present evidence that ﬁrms with higher shares of labour
costs react slower to demand and cost shocks. In addition, Altissimo et al. (2006)
show that ﬁrms with higher labour cost shares tend to exhibit lower frequencies of
price adjustment. The ﬁndings from our survey seem to be consistent with these
conclusions. An analysis of price frequency shows that around 70 per cent of ﬁrms
do not change prices more than once a year; with this percentage being particularly
high in the case of non-ﬁnancial services (Figure 4).
Moreover, in non-ﬁnancial services, unlike other sectors, there is a predominance
of time-dependent rules. Here, price revisions are typically carried out at speciﬁc
moments of the year and, unlike state-dependent price setting rules, they do not
depend on current economic conditions (Figure 5). In the presence of shocks, time-
dependent rules typically lead to greater price rigidity. Dias, Marques and Martins
(2011) show that the frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to
shocks of time-dependent ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly lower than that of state-dependent
ﬁrms, while ﬁrms that are both time- and state-dependent rank in between.
Another way of assessing price rigidity, alternative to the more common approach
based on frequency analysis, is to ﬁnd out directly from the ﬁrms what is speed of
price reactions to signiﬁcant changes in costs or demand. In line with previous
evidence, Figure 6 points to greater rigidity in non-ﬁnancial services, with ﬁrms17
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Figure 5: Price-setting rules: time-dependent vs. state-dependent price setting




























































































































State-dependent Time-dependent (under normal circumstances) Time-dependent (strictly)
Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008).
here taking on average between 8.1 and 9.3 months to adjust their prices, depending
on the type of shock13. This analysis excludes those ﬁrms that apply time-dependent
pricing rules strictly which account for about 25 percent of the total sample. The
ﬁndings also show that ﬁrms appear to react more quickly to positive shocks on the
cost side and negative shocks on the demand side.
As a complement to this evidence, the survey looked into the link between the
frequency of price changes and the frequency of wage changes. The aim was, in
particular, to get answers to the following questions: i) how does the frequency
of price changes compares with the frequency of wage changes? ii) is there any
synchronisation between changes in prices and changes in wages? and iii) are there
signiﬁcant diﬀerences across sectors regarding the frequency and timing of wage and
price changes and their relationship? The approach used in the analysis of price
change frequency was diﬀerent from the procedure for wage change frequency. In
terms of prices, the ﬁrms were asked directly about the frequency of change, while for
wages the frequency of change was analysed through three diﬀerent questions: the
changes stemming from moves in inﬂation, changes deriving from tenure and those
related to other factors. One composite (downward-biased) measure was calculated
for the three motivations, deﬁned as the highest frequency of wage change for each
13By estimating a panel-ordered probit model, Dias, Marques, Martins and Silva (2010) ﬁnd
that the lags of price adjustments vary with the sector, product, and ﬁrm characteristics, namely
the cost structure of the ﬁrm, the type of pricing policy, the competitive environment, the diﬀerent
factors of competitiveness, or the type of good.18
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Figure 6: Speed of price reaction to demand and cost shocks
(excluding ﬁrms that follow time-dependent pricing rules strictly)
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Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
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ﬁrm, irrespective of the speciﬁc determining factor. Results show that the wages of
most workers (85 percent) are changed only once per year (Figure 7). In order to
simplify the comparison, a proxy for the average duration of wage and price spells
was computed by simply multiplying each point category by its respective frequency.
For those categories expressed though intervals the mid-point was assumed14. Table
1 shows that prices in ﬁnancial services, construction and trade have short durations
when compared to manufacturing and other non-ﬁnancial services. However, the
results obtained for the ﬁnancial sector should be interpreted with some caution,
not only because the concept of reference price in this sector may not be absolutely
clear, but also because the questionnaire was ﬁlled in during a period of turmoil
in the international ﬁnancial markets and this may have coloured in some way the
replies from the institutions concerned15. When compared with the EA as a whole,
price spells in Portugal are apparently slightly longer.
As expected, the average duration of wage spells is higher than that of price
spells (at least about 2.0 months on average), and it also shows a smaller sector
variability16. When compared with the EA as a whole, wages remain constant for
14Others more complex distribution-based techniques were also used to assess the robustness
of these durations. Even though the results vary somewhat with the distributional assumptions,
those diﬀerences were qualitatively of minor signiﬁcance.
15As mentioned in section 2, the questionnaire that was sent to banks was somewhat diﬀerent
from the base version. The biggest diﬀerence was in the section related to price setting. In
particular, ﬁrms were asked to take as a reference price the interest rate applied to their main
credit product, assuming a customer with average risk.
16The composite wage duration measure shown in Table 1 was computed on the basis of the19
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Figure 7: Frequency of wage changes
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Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008). 
Table 1: Average duration of wage and price spells
(in months)
Price Composite Memo: Wage durations due to
duration wage duration Inﬂation Tenure Other factors
Total 11.2 12.9 17.8 25.9 18.5
Manufacturing 10.9 12.7 16.1 26.0 17.9
Construction 7.7 13.9 21.9 22.2 19.3
Trade 11.2 11.3 16.3 27.5 19.2
Business services 11.7 13.1 19.3 26.5 18.4
Financial services 7.4 11.9 12.7 18.4 22.0
Very small ﬁrms 10.9 15.0 20.3 25.0 20.2
Small ﬁrms 11.5 14.6 19.2 23.7 20.1
Medium-sized ﬁrms 11.0 14.1 18.5 25.2 18.7
Large ﬁrms 11.3 12.4 17.4 26.2 18.4
Memo:
Euro Area 9.6 14.7 - - -
Source: Druant et al. (2009) and Martins (2009).
Results weighted by employment.20
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Figure 8: Concentration of price and wage setting decisions
(as a percentage of total ﬁrms in the sample; unweighted results)













81% of firms change wages 
in specific months
37% of firms change prices 
in specific months
Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008).  Values computed as a share of all firms with valid responses. The sum 
of percentages exceed the proportion of firms that change wages or prices in specific months as they could choose more 
than one month.
an average period that is around 2 months shorter. Druant et al. (2009) show
that the diﬀerences between European countries in terms of wage durations are
signiﬁcant, though they are relatively slight in terms of sectors. The opposite is true
for prices, where the diﬀerences between countries are of only minor signiﬁcance, but
signiﬁcant in terms of sectors. These results are consistent with the evidence that
diﬀerences between ﬁrms in terms of frequency of price adjustments are determined
to a large extent by their degree of competition and their labour cost share, while
diﬀerences between frequencies of wage changes is to a large extent a reﬂection of
national institutional factors. Another equally relevant factor in the assessment of
ﬁrms’ ﬂexibility when they face changes in their economic environment is the degree
of synchronisation between price changes and wage changes. In order to obtain
empirical evidence on this point, ﬁrms were asked whether changes to their prices
occur without any deﬁned time pattern or if, on the contrary, those changes occur
largely in speciﬁc months of the year. According to the information obtained, in 37
per cent of ﬁrms price changes are concentrated in speciﬁc months of the year, and
64 per cent of these ﬁrms adjust their prices in January (Figure 8).
Firms were also asked whether changes to wages occurred in speciﬁc months of
the year or whether there was no temporal pattern deﬁned. The results show that the
degree of concentration of wage changes is considerably higher than that of prices,
with 81 per cent of wages changed in speciﬁc months of the year. January is the
highest frequency of wage change for each ﬁrm, irrespective of the speciﬁc determining factor
(inﬂation, tenure or other). This measure is somewhat downward biased.21
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Figure 9: Synchronisation between price and wage setting decisions






















































































No link No regular pattern Decisions taken simultaneously Prices set after wages Wages set after prices
Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008).  
month with the largest number of changes. The fact that most decisions on wages
are made in January is probably institutional by nature, both at sectoral level and
at ﬁrm level, a reﬂection of collective labour conventions17. Firms were also asked
about the possible connection between the timing of their price setting and wage
setting decisions. The intensity and direction of this connection is illustrated in
Figure 9. The results suggest that there is some degree of synchronisation between
the timing of price and wage changes, with around 50 per cent of ﬁrms recognising
that a connection does exist. However, only 20 per cent admit that the link is strong:
in 7 per cent the decisions are taken at the same time, in 9 per cent changes in prices
are taken only after wages are set, and in 4 per cent changes in wages occur only
after prices are set. In contrast, in around half of the ﬁrms there does not seem to
be any link between the timing of both decisions.
However, the lack of synchronisation between the two decisions at the micro
level does not necessarily imply that the behaviour of inﬂation is irrelevant when it
comes to setting wages. Survey results show that, among the several factors aﬀecting
the frequency of wage changes, inﬂation is the one triggering most frequent wage
adjustments in frequencies greater or equal to one year (Figure 10).
17The big convergence of changes in wages in speciﬁc periods of the year may also have an impact
on the way that monetary policy decisions aﬀect the real economy. Olivei and Tenreyro (2008)
quote, for example, the case of Japan, where most ﬁrms ﬁx their wages between February and May
each year (the so-called ”Shunto” or great oﬀensive). Results show that a monetary policy shock
in the ﬁrst half of the year - when wages are more ﬂexible - produces less of an impact on economic
activity than one towards the end of the year.22
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Figure 10: Frequency of wage changes







Due to inflation Due to tenure Due to factors other 
than inflation or 
tenure










More than once per year Annually Once every two years Less than once every two years
Source: Surveyon wage setting in Portugal (2008).  
The existence of wage indexation mechanisms is another factor aﬀecting the way
price changes are transmitted to wages. The survey includes two questions that are
geared to assessing the way the inﬂation behaviour is reﬂected in ﬁrms’ base wages.
In the ﬁrst, ﬁrms were asked if the issue of inﬂation was a consideration when they set
their base wages. If yes, they were asked to indicate whether the inﬂation behaviour
is reﬂected automatically in base wages, for instance through an explicit indexation
rule, or if it is used only as a non-formal reference for wage setting. Firms should
also indicate if the most relevant inﬂation for setting base wages is the past or the
expected rate. Table 2 shows that the wages of around 65 per cent of workers are
set with inﬂation as a point of reference, though in most cases this is done only
informally. This ﬁgure is higher than the average for the EA, though less than in
some countries, such as Spain or Belgium. In these, unlike Portugal, the bargaining
systems are characterised by strong automatic wage indexation mechanisms (see
European Central Bank (2008) for a summary of the importance of wage indexation
in several EA countries). On the other hand, expected inﬂation seems to be more
relevant in Portugal than past inﬂation. This goes against the trend in most other
countries, where past inﬂation is of greater importance (Druant et al. (2009)).23
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Table 2: How inﬂation behaviour is reﬂected in ﬁrms’ base wages
(in percentage)
Automatically No formal rule
Past Expected Past Expected Total
inﬂation inﬂation inﬂation inﬂation
Total 1.8 4.8 15.4 42.7 64.6
Manufacturing 3.2 5.9 15.3 44.6 69.1
Construction 1.6 2.7 11.9 31.0 47.2
Trade 0.4 2.0 26.8 43.6 72.9
Business services 1.7 5.9 7.6 39.6 54.8
Financial services 0.0 1.2 37.7 56.5 95.5
Very small ﬁrms 2.9 5.9 8.7 20.0 37.5
Small ﬁrms 4.2 2.7 10.1 18.6 35.5
Medium-sized ﬁrms 2.2 2.0 15.1 29.1 48.4
Large ﬁrms 1.6 5.9 15.7 47.7 70.9
Source: Druant et al. (2009) and Martins (2009).
Results weighted by employment.
5 Wage rigidity: evidence and alternative adjust-
ment mechanisms
5.1 Evidence on downward (real and nominal) wage rigidity
The concept of nominal wage rigidity is frequently associated with legal or con-
tractual constraints which hinder ﬁrms from reducing the wages of their workers18.
In Portugal, there has been a legislative framework since the 1950s barring ﬁrms
from reducing wages, which would suggest a high degree of downward nominal wage
rigidity in Portugal.
The questionnaire contained two questions with the main aim of assessing the
extent to which the possibility of ﬁrms reducing their base wages or increasing them
below the inﬂation rate is constrained by legal or contractual factors19. The ﬁrst
of these questions, ﬁrms were asked if they would have considered the possibility of
changing their base wages in 2006 (the reference year in the survey) in an amount
below the one that was agreed. If the answer was aﬃrmative, ﬁrms should indicate
18A current has been developing recently in the literature on the issue of wage rigidity stemming
from the availability of longitudinal databases such as the QP and the BDRR. In the context of
this literature, nominal wage rigidity is normally illustrated through empirical distributions of wage
changes, where there is an almost total absence of negative wage variations and a notable mass of
probability at zero (see Portugal (2006) and Duarte (2008)). This restriction, however, does not
eliminate the possibility of ﬁrms reducing real wages in response to adverse shocks. All that is
necessary for this is to make sure that the (non-negative) variation in nominal wages is less than
the expected rate of inﬂation. Given this, real wage rigidity is usually measured as the proportion
of workers with a wage variation rate close to the expected rate of inﬂation. In the absence of real
rigidity, the wage variation of these workers would be more moderate.
19These two questions were only included in the Portuguese version of the questionnaire.24
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Table 3: Indicators of downward nominal and real base wage rigidity
(in percentage)
Firms that would like Firms that would like to
to have their base have their base wage increased





Business services 1.2 3.1
Financial services 0.0 0.0
Very small ﬁrms 2.9 3.9
Small ﬁrms 4.8 6.9
Medium-sized ﬁrms 2.5 3.5




Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). Results weighted by employment.
the desired change in base wages. As a measure of downward nominal base wage
rigidity it was considered the share of ﬁrms that would like to reduce their base
wages, while the share of ﬁrms that would like to increase their base wages below
the inﬂation rate was used as a measure of downward real base wage rigidity. Results
show that a small fraction of ﬁrms would consider the possibility of reducing their
base wages in 2006 if there were no legal or contractual restrictions. These ﬁrms
account for 1.6 per cent of total employment in the sample (Table 3), with this
share being higher in ﬁrms applying collective wage agreements, in manufacturing
and smaller ﬁrms. On the other hand, those ﬁrms that would have considered the
possibility of increasing their base wages in 2006 below the inﬂation rate in that
year account for 4.4 per cent of total employment in the sample.
Following the pioneering work of Blinder and Choi (1990), Babecky et al. (2009a)
present an alternative approach to assess nominal and real wage rigidity. In their
work, downward nominal wage rigidity is deﬁned as the share of ﬁrms that state
they have frozen wages at least once in the past ﬁve years. The hypothesis that
is assumed is similar to the one used by Dickens et al. (2007), who assumed that
ﬁrms that freeze their workers’ wage would, in the absence of nominal rigidity, be
accepting a cut in wage. This hypothesis assumes, of course, that those ﬁrms that
never froze their workers’ wages over the ﬁve years prior to the survey do not consider
the impossibility of reducing nominal wages as an active restriction. In relation to
real rigidity, the choice of an indicator is not nearly so clear-cut.
Babecky et al. (2009a) consider as a yardstick for the real rigidity of wages the
percentage of ﬁrms that accept the existence of an automatic connection between25
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Table 4: Alternative indicators of downward nominal and real wage rigidity
(in percentage)
Firms that have frozen their Firms with formal
base wages at least once wage indexation





Business services 38.0 7.6
Financial services 0.0 1.2
Very small ﬁrms 11.9 8.2
Small ﬁrms 18.3 9.5
Medium-sized ﬁrms 18.1 7.7






Source: Babecky et al. (2009a) and survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
Results weighted by employment
the variation of their wages and inﬂation (past or expected). This is clearly a
measure that restricts the degree of real rigidity and, as such, any ﬁndings should
be treated with caution. The results show that nominal rigidity is markedly more
prevalent in the ﬁrms under review than real rigidity (Table 4). These ﬁndings
are in line with those obtained for the United States and for the United Kingdom,
but diﬀerent from those found in many EA countries. It should be noted that the
evidence adduced for various European countries using these two indicators reveals
considerable diﬀerences, both in relation to nominal and real rigidity (see Babecky
et al. (2009a)). Nominal rigidity is, apart from Portugal, particularly strong in the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany and the Netherlands, while it is markedly weaker
in Belgium, Greece and Poland. Moreover, real rigidity is signiﬁcant in Belgium
and Spain, countries where wage indexation is a common practice, in France and in
Hungary, but not relevant in Italy, Greece, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia.
The ﬁndings obtained from our survey show that legal restrictions do have an
impact on reduction or freezing of wages, but workers’ morale and performance are
equally important in a context where ﬁrms have to bring labour costs down (Table
5)20.
20Results do not change by much when it is considered only those ﬁrms that, in the absence of
legal or contractual constraints, would have considered the possibility of reducing their base wages
in 2006 or increasing them below the inﬂation rate.26
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Table 5: Main obstacles to wage cuts/freezes
(in percentage)
Factors Score(a) Factors Score(a)
Wage agreements Impact on ﬁrm’s
and legislation(b) 3.58 reputation 2.93
Impact on workers’ Wages may become
morale 3.44 non competitive 2.92
Impact on workers’ Diﬃculties in attracting
performance 3.39 new workers 2.83
Impact from unexpected Hiring and training costs
changes in wages 3.37 of new workers 2.73
Risk of losing the best workers 3.29
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal. Results weighted by employment.
(a)Average score on a scale from 1 (”Irrelevant”) to 4 (”Very relevant”) weighted
by employment. (b)This factor is only relevant for wage cuts.
5.2 Alternative adjustment mechanisms
In an environment of sticky prices and wages, non-wage labour costs become na im-
portant adjustment tool to exogenous shocks, acting as a buﬀer to negative demand
shocks on ﬁrms’ employment (see Chen and Funke (2003)). Indeed, the importance
of wage rigidity clearly depends on the availability of other mechanisms through
which ﬁrms can reduce their labour costs without changing the base wages. The
information obtained from the survey provides unique evidence on the relevant im-
portance of those alternative mechanisms. In this context, ﬁrms were asked if had
at any time had recourse to ways of cutting labour costs without changing their base
wage. These mechanisms include the possibility of reducing or cutting out monetary
and non-monetary bonuses, taking on new workers with the same characteristics as
those who left but on a lower wage, changing the shifts policy, taking longer over
promotions or reducing the number of employees. The ﬁrms had the chance to
choose more than one of these options. The results show that around 70 per cent
of the ﬁrms have already used at least one of these strategies to cut labour costs,
above all larger ﬁrms and those that apply collective wage agreements (Table 6).
Reducing the number of employees is by far the most frequently used alternative,
particularly in ﬁnancial services and in larger ﬁrms. Other frequently used mecha-
nisms are taking longer over promotions or introducing a freeze, and hiring workers
at wages below those who leave.
6 Reaction of ﬁrms to shocks
The information gathered from the survey also made it possible to analyse the way
ﬁrms reacted to unexpected and generalised adverse shocks. Three types of shocks27
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Table 6: Alternative strategies to reduce labour costs
(in percentage)
Reduce Reduce Change Reduce Hire new Reduce At least
monet. non-monet. shifts pace of workers at number one
beneﬁts beneﬁts policy promotions lower wages workers strategy
Total 20.1 19.2 12.8 27.6 24.0 56.6 70.5
Manufact. 17.2 11.0 13.2 14.1 23.2 57.1 70.3
Constr. 8.5 5.5 8.3 17.1 15.7 47.4 55.4
Trade 28.3 18.6 19.9 30.5 28.5 52.6 68.4
Bus. serv. 16.5 22.1 13.9 26.0 20.6 53.2 69.8
Finan. serv. 41.1 40.0 0.0 77.9 41.5 82.3 87.2
Firms’ size:
Very small 5.1 4.4 3.0 9.4 5.3 30.7 44.7
Small 15.7 10.2 7.4 14.9 15.5 40.4 57.6
Medium 17.2 9.1 13.1 14.8 19.5 42.7 62.9
Large 21.2 22.6 13.0 31.8 25.8 61.4 73.5
Coll. agr.:
Yes 24.0 24.1 13.7 27.4 23.0 63.4 75.2
No 9.3 6.3 10.7 27.9 27.4 39.0 58.7
Memo:
EA 20.6 - 21.4 25.2 38.8 20.7(a) 63.5
Source: Babecky et al. (2009b) and survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008). Results
weighted by employment.
were given: a fall in demand for the main product; a highly relevant rise in the cost of
an intermediate good, such as a rise in the price of fuel; and a permanent rise in wages
due, for example, to the renegotiation of collective wage agreements. Firms were
asked to put a value between 1 (”Irrelevant”) and 4 (”Very relevant”) on the relative
importance of the following four strategies relating to adjustments to the shocks
suggested: i) a change to prices; ii) a change to margins; iii) a cut in production;
iv) a cut in costs. The results are given in Table 7 and they show that, regardless
of the type of shock, a cut in other costs seems clearly to be the dominant strategy.
However, adjustments to prices and margins are also used, as opposed to reducing
production, which comes in as far less relevant, with the exception of demand shocks.
In addition, shocks to demand seem to be those that on average aﬀect ﬁrms most
forcibly. It should be noted that the strategies used are not mutually exclusive.
Firms may combine more than one, and the most frequent combination is to cut
other costs at the same time as adjusting prices.
Those ﬁrms where the strategy of cutting costs was deemed to be to be relevant
or very relevant were asked to indicate the most likely way to reduce those costs,
having in mind the three types of shocks and two skill levels. Firms could opt for one
of six strategies: i) a cut in base wages; ii) a cut in the ﬂexible components of wages;
iii) a cut in the number of workers with permanent contracts; iv) a cut in the number
of workers with temporary contracts; v) a cut in the number of working hours; vi)28
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Table 7: Firms’ reaction to unanticipated shocks
Demand shock Cost shock Wage shock
Score(a) Share(b) Score(a) Share(b) Score(a) Share(b)
Reduce other costs 3.7 80.9 3.1 71.8 3.1 68.4
Adjusting prices 3.0 64.0 3.0 62.7 2.8 58.1
Reduce margins 3.1 56.7 2.7 47.7 2.7 53.4
Reduce production 3.3 48.9 2.3 23.5 2.2 20.9
Source: Babecky et al. (2009b) and Survey on wage setting in Portugal. Results
weighted by employment.
Notes: (a)Average score on a scale from 1 (”Irrelevant”) to 4 (”Very relevant”)
weighted by the number of workers. (b)Firms that consider the shock as being
relevant or very relevant (as a percentage of total employment in the sample.)
Table 8: Strategies to reduce costs: by type of shock and workers’ qualiﬁcation
(as a percentage of total employment in the sample)
After a demand After a cost After a wage
shock shock shock
Skilled Unskill. Skilled Unskill. Skilled Unskill.
Reducing:
Base wages 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.2 - -
Flexible wage component 28.7 14.2 26.5 13.5 15.2 26.1
Workers permanent contract 5.5 10.2 5.9 9.7 9.1 7.9
Workers temporary contract 16.6 34.8 13.6 30.0 33.3 16.2
Hours per worker 7.2 9.1 5.5 8.0 6.9 4.8
Other costs 40.0 30.5 47.0 37.5 35.5 44.9
Source: Survey on wage setting in Portugal (2008).
a cut in other costs. Other costs included advertising costs, administrative costs,
or the costs of renegotiating prices with suppliers. The results are given in Table 8,
which shows that most ﬁrms in Portugal put reduction in other costs as the most
likely strategy in almost all the scenarios set out. Firms also seem to diﬀerentiate
between workers according to their skill levels. Apart from cutting other costs, in
the event of an adverse shock on demand or on the price of a relevant raw material,
ﬁrms would opt more for a cut in the ﬂexible components of wages for more qualiﬁed
workers and a cut in the number of workers with temporary contracts in the case
of less skilled workers. Where there is a shock to wages, the relationship between
these two strategies and the level of qualiﬁcations is inverted.
7 Concluding remarks
Recent research points to the existence of a negative relationship between price
rigidity and ﬁrms’ labour cost share. In particular, empirical evidence based on mi-
croeconomic data shows that sectors with higher labour cost share are those where
changes to prices are less frequent. Other measurements of price rigidity based on29
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qualitative information presented in this paper are consistent with these ﬁndings.
They include the frequency of price changes, the speed of price changes when shocks
occur or the importance of time-dependent pricing rules. This evidence suggests
that a deeper knowledge of wage dynamics is crucial for a better understanding of
how prices are determined and, in a more general way, how the monetary policy
transmission mechanism works. There are other factors that justify the increasing
interest in research in this area. They include the importance of the labour markets
in explaining the cyclical behaviour of the economy and the persistence of structural
rigidity factors in labour markets. Empirical research is fundamental for the deﬁni-
tion of stylised facts on wage dynamics, while theoretical research is important to
adequately incorporate the behaviour of labour markets in stochastic models of gen-
eral equilibrium. Based on the information from a survey conducted by the Banco
de Portugal in the ﬁrst half of 2008, this paper presented a number of stylised facts
on price and wage dynamics in Portugal. These facts are summed up below:
1. A small fraction of the ﬁrms surveyed state that, in the absence of legal or
contractual constraints, would consider the possibility of reducing their base
wages in 2006 or increase them below the inﬂation rate;
2. Apart from legal and contractual constraints, the impact on workers’ morale
or performance and the risk that the best workers leave the ﬁrm are other
important obstacles to wage cuts or freezes;
3. Firms frequently make use of alternative mechanisms to reduce labour costs,
rather than changes to base wages, with cuts in the number of workers being
the most frequent form of adjustment;
4. In many ﬁrms the wage scale agreed in the context of collective wage agree-
ments is taken merely as a reference, with a considerable percentage of workers
receiving wages above the amount agreed in collective wage agreements;
5. Most wages are deﬁned with the behaviour of inﬂation borne in mind, above
all expected inﬂation, though without any formal rule;
6. Changes in wages occur less frequently than changes in prices. If frequencies
are converted into durations, it can be seen that the average duration of wages
is slightly higher than one year - about 2 months less than in the euro area
and 2.0 months longer than the average duration of prices;
7. Sectoral variability of wage durations is signiﬁcantly lower than that of prices.
This is also found in most European countries;30
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8. Changes to wages are more closely synchronised than changes to prices. 81 per
cent of ﬁrms concentrate their wage changes in speciﬁc months of the year (37
per cent in the case of prices), with a very signiﬁcant fraction making these
changes in January.
Recent empirical evidence has thrown down a major challenge to researchers. New
facts have come to light as a result of analysing large-scale microeconomic databases,
either quantitative ones or those based on surveys of ﬁrms. This should act as a spur
for the scientiﬁc community to develop theories that incorporate this new evidence
in models of general equilibrium.31
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